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We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations.
Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation
announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.
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Adoption of inflation targeting (IT) is aimed at moderating
inflation expectations by not only providing discipline in the
setting of monetary policy, but also by improving the com-
munication between the policy makers and the public. If the
central bank does not gain the necessary trust to hone the public's
inflation expectations toward its announced target, then expecta-
tions respond only slowly to the target rate, and the monetary
authority fails to eliminate the inflation bias of economic agents.
Bernanke, in his FRB speech, emphasizes the importance of
central bank credibility “…Clearly there are limits to what talk can
achieve; ultimately, talk must be backed up by action, in the form
of successful policies… Credibility is not a permanent character-☆ We thank the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey for the
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doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.002istic of a central bank; it must be continuously earned…”.1 In our
study, we investigate how the announcements shape inflation
expectations and how the ITcentral bank's performance in hitting
its announced target influences its credibility.
The literature on credibility of announcements (Cukierman,
1992; Faust and Svensson, 2001; Walsh, 1999, 2003) argues that
there are two gains from making announcements, 1) the central
bank is able to respond to the supply shocks (without distorting
the public's inflation expectation) that only itself observes, and
more importantly 2) the public can improve its forecast of the
central bank's true preferences. In environments where the public
is uncertain about the (weights of the) central bank's reaction
function, they will use the target announcements as additional
information in forming their inflation expectations. The empirical
studies about IT's impact on inflation expectations find that
credibility and control over inflation expectations cannot be
achieved immediately. Johnson (2002), using a panel of 11
countries, shows that IT leads to declines in inflation forecasts
without affecting their dispersion while Fraga et al. (2003) argue1 Ben S. Bernanke's speech at the Annual Washington Policy Conference of
the National Association of Business Economists, Washington, D.C on March
25, 2003.
3 Monthly frequency data is obtained from Global Financial Statistics (GFS).
The CPI series is reported quarterly for NZ, so GFS uses the quarterly values to
fill in the missing months within each quarter. We do not perform any
interpolations since 1) forecasters use the same quarterly values to update their
monthly reported expectations, and 2) interpolation would lead to artificial and
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dibility) have to work harder toward this goal. Only forceful
reactions to economic shocks by the central bank will force
agents' inflation expectations not to significantly deviate from the
target and increase the credibility of the central bank.
In our analysis, we inspect the impact of target announce-
ments to see how they help the public to learn about the central
bank's objectives. The hypothesis we would like to test is how
“credible” and “stable” announcements change the publics'
learning behavior. As the central bank delivers on its announced
targets or relays as much information as possible to the public,
the public should concentrate their inflation expectations around
the announced target. In testing our claims, we use survey
data from two early adopters of IT, United Kingdom (UK) and
New Zealand (NZ), with sufficient length of data under IT and
significant differences between the frequencies of their inflation
target announcements. Both countries adopted the IT regime in
early 1990s (1993 for UK and 1990 for NZ), giving us at least
13 years of data for our analysis. Aside from the sample length,
UK is very different than NZ in having a very stable inflation
target with only one change in their target while NZ changed its
targets quite frequently (40 changes in the sample period).
Using inflation forecasts from both countries and state space
methodology, we find that forecasters give more weight to the
announcements when they are more accurate and frequently
changing. In the next section, we elaborate on the model while
Section 3 displays the estimation results. The last section
concludes.
2. Model and methodology
In our model, we follow Walsh (1999) and assume that in
an environment with uncertain policy objectives, central
banks realize the potential of their announcements to
influence inflation expectations of private agents. These
announcements reveal more information to the public on the
central bank's intentions and also discipline the central bank
by providing a benchmark that will be used in its performance
evaluation. In such a setting, Walsh shows that even though
the banks don't reveal their private information, their
announcements provide means to public to revise their
expectations and reduce the inflation bias. His result (page
265) regarding the dynamics of how the announcements are
incorporated into the public's expectations could be repre-
sented as
petþ1 ¼ pet þ ht pat  pet
 þ et ð1Þ
where πt
e is the inflation expectation, πt
a is the announcement
of the target, and θt is the credibility or reputation function.
2
Such models are analogous to the ones in the learning
literature where agents use recursive estimations to form their
expectations.2 Theta could be seen as the ratio of the population believing the central
bank's announcement in forming their expectations.For θt, we use Cukierman's (1992) definition of marginal
credibility, also formulated by Faust and Svensson (2001) as
minus the absolute value of the difference between the actual
inflation rate and the one public actually expects the central
bank to deliver. For our model, their formulation implies
ht ¼ jpt1  pat1j ð2Þ
In other words, the central bank's reputation is dependent on
its past performance of delivering the announced target. Using a
more general function, θt=− f (πt− 1−πt− 1a ), approximating it in
the second-order around zero (E(θt)=− f (0)−E(πt− 1−πt− 1a ) f '−
E(πt− 1−πt− 1a )2f ″ / 2) and calculating the variance term using a
moving average window enable us to also include previous
performances of the central bank in the reputation function.
Specifically, we expect to find increasing θt as the central bank
gains more credibility by hitting its target repeatedly, so the
expected signs for f ′ and f ″ are negative and positive,
respectively, while − f (0) should be 1.
In our estimations we use a combination of survey and
actual inflation data for UK and NZ. The expectations data for
retail price inflation in UK and CPI inflation in NZ are obtained
from Consensus Economics. Consensus forecasts are monthly
reported expectations for the end of current year and the next
year. Using them and realized inflation series3, we derive
monthly expected rate of inflation for the next 12-months as in
Johnson (2003). The calculation results are displayed in Figs. 1
and 2, which show a tight fit in UK of expectations to actual
inflation especially after the switch to IT whereas in NZ, the
situation is not that clear-cut.
Since the expected inflation and announcement data are
observed, we use state space estimation, specifically the
Kalman filter method, to estimate our time varying credibility
parameter. Kalman filter is quite appropriate for our purposes
due to its continuous updating (of θt) during the process of
expectations formation. We choose the initial parameter values
as 1 for θ0, and 0.9 for its persistence;
4 and finally we
determine the error variances, σɛ
2 and συ
2 via a grid search and
pick the values that give us the minimum regression standard
error.
3. Results
As mentioned earlier, an increase in credibility via good
inflation performance should lead to stable inflation expectationspossibly incorrect changes in the variance terms. Unreported results using
quarterly data, which can be provided by the authors upon request, confirm our
monthly findings with slightly larger standard errors.
4 The fairly large level of persistence in reputations is quite conservative for
our sample countries since it implies that the reputation cost of deviations from
target are prohibitive. The results are robust to different initial values.
Fig. 1. Inflation and expectations in UK.
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increase in θt. Using the estimated time-varying values for θt, we
calculate the predicted inflation series, displayed in Figs. 3 and 4.
An interesting result of this initial step is the deviation of model
predictions from UK inflation survey values around 1997. ThisFig. 2. Inflation and expectaoccurs right around the Bank of England's (BoE) independence,
pointing to increased public uncertainty about the new objective
function of the central bank.
Next, we analyze how and why the public changes their
learning parameter in response to the central bank's accuracy oftions in New Zealand.
Fig. 3. Survey Inflation Expectations and Kalman Projections — UK.
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Therefore, the variables used in the regression are the terms in the
approximated credibility function, namely difference of inflation
from the announcement |πt−1
a −πt−1| and the variation of thisFig. 4. Survey Inflation Expectationsdifferential calculated from a 1-year moving window, var(πa−π).
We estimate this system of two countries with the help of a
dummy variableDUK, which takes the value of 1 for UK and 0 for
NZ.We run a second estimationwith a decomposed version of theand Kalman Projections — NZ.
Table 1
Empirical analysis of the time varying parameter θt
Coeff. Coeff. (variance broken down)
Constant 0.12 ⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.063 ⁎⁎ (0.022)
DUK 0.17 ⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.207 ⁎⁎ (0.042)
|πa−π| −0.03 ⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.016 ⁎⁎ (0.005)
|πa−π|DUK −0.31⁎⁎ (0.03) −0.322 ⁎⁎ (0.030)
var(πa−π) 0.03⁎⁎ (0.01)
var(πa−π)DUK 0.22 ⁎⁎ (0.08)
var(πa) 10.57 ⁎⁎ (2.87)
var(π) 0.129⁎ (0.066)
var(πa)DUK −15.45 ⁎⁎ (4.38)







⁎⁎ (⁎) indicates 95% (90%) significance level. Since DUK is 1 for UK and 0 for
NZ, NZ sets the benchmark while interactive terms represent UK. † Due to the
stability of the target in UK, the dummy and interactive variance term are very
highly correlated. Separate regressions of UK result in even a higher positive
coefficient for the variance term. Covariance term is left out of the regression
due to its high (0.98) correlation with NZ target variance.
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estimation results are displayed in the second and third columns of
Table 1. The results show that i) above 35% of variation in theta is
explained by the two moments of the inflation-announcement
differential,6 and ii) credibility increases with more accurate
announcements and less variation in this accuracy. The
significantly different first moment coefficients show that the
agents in UK value the information content of the past record of
BoE in hitting its targets more than the forecasters in NZ.
Decomposition of the variance term illustrates that the more
frequent the announcements are the more people pay attention to
them. In other words, since BoE has had only one target rate
change in the 13 years under IT regime, the past deviations of
actual inflation from the target are frequently used by the public in
updating their expectations. On the other hand, in NZ, since the
targets change extremely frequently, the public focuses more on
the announcements than the actual inflation itself, apparent from
the positive coefficient on the var(πa−π) parameter.7 In short, our5 The covariance term is left out of the regression due to its high collinearity
with the NZ target variance.
6 Addition of output gap brings another 5% explanation of the variation in
theta.
7 The magnitude of the interactive term coefficient for announcement
variance in UK is due to the almost nonexistent variation in the target.estimations show that the announcements carry a large informa-
tion content in IT regime and their accuracy and frequency
influence the extent the public believes in the central bank's
announcements and acts accordingly.
4. Conclusion
In our study, we examine the credibility performance of
central banks under inflation targeting. We use inflation surveys
from the UK and New Zealand due to significant dissimilarity
between the two countries in the operational application of IT
monetary policy. Estimating our model with state space repre-
sentation of a time varying credibility measure shows that both
the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have
a positive effect on how much attention the public pays to the
target announcements.
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